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Anachronism is one of the most common distorsions of history by which we circumscribe the past with our own mental universe. That is what the modem West has done and continues to do as regards Islam - a society almost without distinction of time or space. Thus today the encounter between Western Christendom and Islam is commonly seen as essentially negative, having been reduced to the military - religious conflict of the Crusades during the ll,h and 13,h centuries. Of course, it was at that period of time that took shape a Catholic view of Islam as a religion obnoxiously stereotyped, a view which would spread across Europe and which, much later, would give rise to a truly different form of racism, still around to day. Such an overall despising attitude tends to cover up the positive aspects of what had been the encounter between Islam and Christianity. Y et, those were many and they have been invaluable in the development of the Western thought and sciences. Far from being only a region of conflict, at that time the Mediterranean was also a zone of cultural symbiosis to which the modem West owes much. Europe would do well to remember this today that its supremacy is already part of a past which is definitely over.

What the United Nations brought to the International Community during its forty years of life cannot be assessed only by referring to the working of the institution and the success or failures it encountered in dealing with specific questions or crises. The profound and lasting changes in the International Community itself in which it contributed in bringing about must also be taken into consideration. Undoubtedly, the most considerable of these changes, a mutation, in the real sense of the word, was the passage from an international society centered around Europe and North-America in 1945, to a truly world society in 1985, through the process of decolonisation. The United Nations decisively contributed to the spreading of the ideology of decolonisation, to the enactment of an international law of decolonisation and to the use of multilateral diplomacy against colonial powers. Eventually, admission to the United Nations became the visible sign as well as the final step of the attainment of political independence.
Another remarkable new feature of the international society of today, closely related to the preceding one, is the importance of groups of states, like the Seventy Seven and the Non Aligned, acting as pressure groups. This new setting was made possible only with the existence of the United Nations, where "group diplomacy" was able to deploy itself and to make the "power of the number" felt.
Eventually, the whole present diplomatic game, which is played at the level of the world rather than on a bilateral or regional basis in an always growing number of fields, is a product of development of multilateral diplomacy within the United Nations. It is specially true of the so-called North-South dialogue - or confrontation.
The World Organization is now an irreversible fact of international life and a reflection of the present structure of the International Society that it helped to build up. But on the other hand, it is a very novel experiment in a historical perspective. Much is y et to be learned in order to be able to make the best use of the instruments it affords for managing the world community.

It is generally accepted that a power relation is at the base of every negotiation and that, to the extent possible, each State attempts to negotiate when that relation is the most weighted in its favour, especially if the subject matter of negotiation is perceived by it as being of vital importance.
Over several years all of Israel's neighbours, Egypt among them, obstinately refused to negotiate (at least openly) with the Zionist State apparently counting on an improvement in the power relation in their favour. An improvement moreover that eventually seemed possible with the relative yet nonetheless important successes of the October 1973 war.
The enigma that Sadat's policy constitutes from this vantage point resides precisely in the fact that that policy appears to upset the power relation that made the October War possible and that led to Israel's first setback. The economic difficulties and reorientation of the Egyptian regime (both towards the West and towards private enterprise) do not, by themselves, explain what is referred to as Egypt's « defeatist » diplomacy. This diplomacy also reflects a strategic coherency that can only be understood within the historical perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and by undertaking a rigourous analysis of Zionism and its principal sources of political support. Sadat, by a paradoxical exploitation of a position of weakness, attempts to transform politically that relative weakness into a position of strength in order to wrest from Israel that which the Arabs have not succeeded in obtaining by armed force. He pursues the war, but by the other means. Nevertheless, the success of these means depends to a great extent on the attitudes of the other countries of the battlefield.

The Middle East is generally perceived in the West, often in simplistic terms, as an area which is crucial to the West's economic and strategic interests. Given the complexity of this new « Eastern question », the Western perspective is important because it counts for a lot in determining the future of this region and in defining the position the Middle East holds in the world System. This dominant perspective has nonetheless the defect of putting on the back burner the interests of the peoples of the Middle East and the possibilities of a different scenario which corresponds less with the designs of the great powers today and more with the needs of the Middle Eastern countries.
The present and future position of the Middle East in the world System should thus be examined from an internal viewpoint as much as from an external one. Seen from the outside, the region appears essentially as a pawn. From this perspective, the deterioration of the Palestinian question permits the great powers (particularly the United States) to keep the Arab governments divided and thus blocks the way to regional cooperation susceptible to putting the energy resources of the oil producers at the service of self-directed development in the region. Seen from the inside, however, this cooperation, beyond its economic advantages, has interesting social and cultural possibilities, It is thus a question of knowing which conditions would develop these possibilities. The question is important because, to a certain extent, the outcome of the Middle Eastern situation will serve as an example to the Third World as a whole to the extent that the Middle East develops a strategy for a new kind of development defined and carried out free from dependency on external powers. The precondition to this effort is clearly the formulation and effective maintenance of a common Arab position which is coherent and realistic on the Palestinian question ; inevitably this is central to all Middle Eastern policy.